Policy, Uniformity, Discretion, and Congress’s Sentencing Acid Trip by Osler, Mark
BYU Law Review
Volume 2009 | Issue 2 Article 2
5-1-2009
Policy, Uniformity, Discretion, and Congress’s
Sentencing Acid Trip
Mark Osler
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mark Osler, Policy, Uniformity, Discretion, and Congress’s Sentencing Acid Trip, 2009 BYU L. Rev. 293 (2009).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2009/iss2/2
OSLER.PP3 3/13/2009 9:18 AM 
 
293 
Policy, Uniformity, Discretion, and Congress’s 
Sentencing Acid Trip 
Mark Osler ∗ 
I. THE POINTLESS FOREST AND THE POINTLESS MAN 
Around 1970, singer Harry Nilsson went on an acid trip. He 
later reported that during this experience, he “looked at the trees 
and . . . realized that they all came to points, and the little branches 
came to points, and the houses came to a point. [He] thought ‘Oh! 
Everything has a point, and if it doesn’t, then there’s a point to it.’”1 
Nilsson put these insights to good use, later producing an album 
and an animated film, both entitled The Point!.2 In either format, The 
Point! tells the story of Oblio, who along with his dog, Arrow, is 
thrown out of the land of Point because Oblio does not have a point 
on top of his head like everyone else. They are banished to the scary 
Pointless Forest, where they encounter the Pointless Man, another 
banished soul who welcomes them as they begin their journey. The 
Pointless Man, as drawn, has several pointy faces and actual arrows 
emanating from his torso, all pointing in different directions. 
Once Oblio enters the Pointless Forest and actually meets the so-
called Pointless Man, Oblio has a radical change in perspective: “You 
see the Pointless Man did have a point; in fact, he had hundreds of 
them, all pointing in different directions. But as he so quickly 
pointed out, ‘A point in every direction is the same as no point at 
all.’”3  
Which (of course) brings us to Congress and federal sentencing. 
Congress has issued at least thirty-one separate directives setting 
 
∗ Professor of Law, Baylor Law School; B.A. 1985, College of William and Mary; J.D. 
1990, Yale Law School. I would like to thank Craig Pankratz for his extensive help in 
researching this Article. 
 1. HARRY NILSSON, THE POINT! (BMG Entm’t Jan. 1971), available at 
http://www.harrynilsson.com/page-the-point.html. 
 2. The animated version was televised by ABC on February 2, 1971, and was narrated 
by Dustin Hoffman. Later narrators on subsequent versions included Alan Thicke and Ringo 
Starr. Id. 
 3. HARRY NILSSON, The Pointless Man, on THE POINT! (BMG Entm’t Jan. 1971). 
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general policy goals in criminal sentencing.4 While each of these 
policy goals has an individual purpose, when taken together they are 
 
 4. Those thirty-one directives mandate that each of the following be considered in 
creating guidelines, sentencing individuals, or both: 
1) The nature of the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2004). 
2) The circumstances of the offense. Id. 
3) The history of the defendant. Id. 
4) The characteristics of the defendant. Id. 
5) The seriousness of the offense. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(A). 
6) Promotion of respect for the law. Id. 
7) Just punishment for the offense. Id.; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1, pt. 
A, ¶ 2, introductory cmt. (2007).  
8) Deterrence to criminal conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B) (2004); U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1, pt. A, ¶ 2, introductory cmt. (2007). 
9) Protection of the public from further crimes by the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) 
(2004). 
10) To provide defendants with needed education or vocational training. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(D). 
11) To provide defendants with needed medical care or other correctional treatment. Id. 
12) The kinds of sentences available. Id. § 3553(a)(3). 
13) Policy statements by the Sentencing Commission. Id. § 3553(a)(5). 
14) The need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records 
found guilty of similar conduct. Id. § 3553(a)(6); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 
1A1.1, pt. A, ¶ 2, introductory cmt. (2007). 
15) Provision of restitution. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(7) (2004). 
16) Incapacitating the offender. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1, pt. A, ¶ 2, 
introductory cmt. (2007). 
17) Rehabilitating the offender. Id. 
18) Proportionality in sentencing for conduct of differing severity. Id. 
19) Input from the Probation system, Judicial conference, DOJ, and Federal Defenders. 28 
U.S.C. § 994(o) (2006). 
20) Directions from Congress. Note following 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2006). 
21) Maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted. 28 
U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2006). 
22) Reflect advancements in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice 
process. Id. § 991(b)(1)(C). 
23) Neutrality as to race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of offenders. 28 
U.S.C. § 994(d) (2006). 
24) Fairness in sentencing. Id. §§ 991(b)(1)(B), 994(f). 
25) Sentences need to be near the statutory maximum for crimes of violence or certain drug 
offenses. Id. § 994(h). 
26) Sentences need to allow for probation for certain first offenders. Id. § 994(j). 
27) Average sentences prior to imposition of the Guidelines. Id. § 994(m). 
28) Effect on prison populations. Id. § 994(q). 
29) Certainty. Id. §§ 991(b)(1)(B), 994(f). 
30) The community view of the gravity of an offense. Id. § 994(c)(4). 
31) The current incidence of an offense in the community and nation as a whole. Id. § 
994(c)(7). 
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as pointless as the Pointless Man. This Article contends that the 
federal sentence guidelines are directed in too many ways at the same 
time; as a result they reflect conflicting policies and have no moral 
center. The guidelines should be rewritten in accordance with a few 
well-articulated policy goals.  
Part II considers some of these thirty-one policy directives, which 
all point in different directions with different degrees of specificity, 
clarity, and import. In setting out what some of these policy 
directives seek, it becomes clear that federal sentencing policy 
resembles nothing so much as Nilsson’s Pointless Man.  
Part III, in turn, describes some of the underlying conflicts 
between these principles. It then describes the effect of combining a 
thirty-one-point policy directive together with a strong mandate for 
uniformity. This project—putting a pointless mish-mash of policy 
directives together with a demand for uniform punishments—does 
not make much sense. Without a clear policy goal, uniformity is as 
likely to be uniformly wrong as it is to be uniformly right relative to 
any understandable principle or set of principles. What is the sense in 
having consistent and uniform sentencing if it is consistently and 
uniformly wrong? To insist on uniformity without principled 
directives to create those uniform results does nothing less than rob 
sentencing of any sense of real authority by making it morally 
indeterminate.5 
Finally, Part IV suggests a do-over for federal sentencing, in 
which a new Sentencing Commission would start with a small 
number of reasonable policy goals and then re-make the guidelines 
in a way that meets those goals. Opponents to re-making the 
guidelines would no doubt (justifiably) fear the specter of greater 
discretion for judges being a feature of any new system. This “fear of 
judging,” as Stith and Cabranes called it,6 is our modern equivalent 
of the Pointless Forest—we (through our legislators) are scared to 
 
 5. An analogy to denominational religion may help an understanding of the oddity of 
this combination. Those faiths most judgmental of moral behavior tend to be those with a 
defined set of core beliefs that are maintained by a magisterium. On the other hand, those 
faiths that embrace a wide variety of beliefs (such as the Bahá’í or Unitarian/Universalists) 
tend to be more tolerant of a wide variety of behavior and belief. The current federal 
sentencing system turns this on its head—it is as if the Unitarian/Universalists, despite 
tolerating a wide array of moral principles, were suddenly harshly judgmental of those who 
violated the tenets of any faith. 
 6. KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1998). 
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enter a world where judges exercise independent discretion because 
we do not know everything that may lie in wait for us there. After all, 
individuals, even individual judges chosen expressly for their superior 
discretion and judgment, can be unpredictable. Given the 
pointlessness of current “policy,” however, the prospect of reformed 
guidelines with individual judges more actively evaluating cases 
becomes more appealing. With a new system and more empowered 
judges exercising a greater degree of judicial discretion, there would 
be a much better chance that policy and outcome would match.  
II. A POINT IN EVERY DIRECTION IS THE SAME AS NO POINT AT 
ALL 
A. It Used to be Simple 
The policy goals of federal sentencing used to be simple. As 
continues to be true in many other nations,7 four simple goals 
structured United States sentencing.8 These four goals shifted in 
importance over time relative to one another, but as a whole 
remained constant. One advantage to this framework was that the 
goals of sentencing were easily understood. They simply sought to 
(1) punish offenders (retribution), (2) deter both the offender and 
others from committing further crimes (deterrence), (3) incapacitate 
dangerous individuals so they could not cause more harm 
(incapacitation), and (4) rehabilitate some offenders for both their 
benefit and that of the larger society (rehabilitation).  
Certainly, these four traditional goals were often in tension.9 For 
example, some might insist that incapacitation of the defendant 
through imprisonment is necessary in a given case to protect the 
community; meanwhile, others might insist that rehabilitation is 
possible. These goals would be served by different means: prison for 
the former and treatment for the latter. Despite such tensions, these 
 
 7. See Andrew Dubinsky, Note, An Examination of International Sentencing 
Guidelines and a Proposal for Amendments to the International Criminal Court’s Sentencing 
Structure, 33 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 609, 618–19 (2007) (discussing the 
goals of punishment considered by the International Criminal Court). 
 8. See Patricia M. Wald, Why Focus on Women Offenders?, 16 CRIM. JUST. 10, 11 
(2001); Dubinsky, supra note 7, at 618–19.. 
 9. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 6, at 9–22 (describing the conflicts between and 
changing roles of these sentencing goals in American history). 
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limited goals allowed judges to weigh them relative to one another 
and evaluate each defendant by the same standards.  
On a macro level, the simplicity of these traditional goals also 
allowed for a national debate over which goal should predominate, 
and the goals shifted in importance over time. For example, 
beginning in the late nineteenth century the goal of rehabilitation 
was ascendant.10 As Doug Berman has noted, this rehabilitative ideal 
was framed in medical terms, with the criminal viewed as “sick” and 
in need of a “cure.”11 The traditional goals, then, provided not only 
reasonable guideposts for the use of discretion, but framed the 
national debate on sentencing in an understandable way, with a 
known and limited number of trade-offs available.  
These goals of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation still remain in the federal scheme, at least in the sense 
they are listed in the statute book. Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 3553 
directs a judge to consider the need for a sentence to reflect “just 
punishment,”12 to provide “adequate deterrence to criminal 
conduct,”13 “to protect the public from further crimes of the 
defendant,”14 and “to provide the defendant with needed 
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional 
treatment in the most effective manner.”15  
Unfortunately, Congress did not stop there. While the policy 
goals encompassed within retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, 
and rehabilitation remain in the books, they have been buried 
beneath an avalanche of other goals, including (perhaps most 
importantly) uniformity. While I have previously addressed the sad 
fact that the federal sentencing guidelines wholly ignore these goals 
in the machinery it establishes to calculate a sentence,16 this Article 
addresses a related but different question: Has the wide variety of 
 
 10. See Douglas A. Berman, Reconceptualizing Sentencing, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 3 
(2005). 
 11. Id. at 4. 
 12. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2004).  
 13. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(B). 
 14. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(C). 
 15. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(D). 
 16. See Mark Osler, Must Have Got Lost: Traditional Sentencing Goals, the False Trail of 
Uniformity and Process, and the Way Back Home, 54 S.C. L. REV. 649, 654–56 (2003); Mark 
Osler, Uniformity and Traditional Sentencing Goals in the Age of Feeney, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 
253, 253–54 (2004), quoted in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 296 n.15 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
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diverse policy goals packed into the federal sentencing system made 
that system morally indeterminate? 
B. The Non-Traditional Policy Goals 
In addition to the traditional policy goals that are buried in 
federal sentencing policy, Congress has articulated several other 
policy directives. These are directed to the Sentencing Commission 
and judges, both of which have roles in turning policy into action—
the Sentencing Commission through creation and revision of the 
sentencing guidelines and judges through the act of sentencing itself. 
Even though the directives were largely enacted together 
through the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, these directives for 
sentencing, sadly, are not grouped together in the federal code.17 
Rather, they are lumped together in three separate places, leading to 
frequent redundancies and confusion, all of which adds to the 
controversy attached to the guidelines. One of those places is 18 
U.S.C. § 3553, which has been at the center of nearly every federal 
sentencing controversy since United States v. Booker.18 In Booker, the 
Supreme Court declared that the sentencing guidelines were no 
longer strictly mandatory and that § 3553 was to be the guiding 
statute of sentencing judges and courts of appeals.19 Though § 3553 
itself seems clearly directed to sentencing judges and not to the 
Sentencing Commission,20 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) in turn directs the 
Sentencing Commission to consider some of those same objectives.21 
As Justice Breyer somewhat famously stated in Rita v. United 
States,22 “the sentencing statutes envision both the sentencing judge 
and the Commission as carrying out the same basic § 3553(a) 
objectives, the one, at retail, the other at wholesale.”23 That is, while 
the judge applies these standards to individual defendants, the 
 
 17. For a worthwhile history of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, see Kristin J. 
Balding, Comment, It Is a ‘War On Drugs’ and It Is Time to Reload Our Weapons: An 
Interpretation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1449 (1999). 
 18. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 19. Id. at 259–60. 
 20. For example, the key provisions included at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) are prefaced with 
“The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider.” 
 21. Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A) directs the Sentencing Commission to 
“assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set forth in section 3553(a)(2).” 
 22. 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007). 
 23. Id. at 2463. 
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Sentencing Commission applies them broadly in directing the 
judges. 
Though 18 U.S.C. § 3553 contains the best-known set of 
sentencing policy goals, it by no means contains the only set. The 
statute that established the Sentencing Commission itself, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 991, contains not only specific sentencing policy goals,24 but also a 
sweeping description of how the guidelines as a whole should look:  
 
The purposes of the United States Sentencing Commission 
are to . . . . provide certainty and fairness in meeting the 
purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing 
disparities among defendants with similar records who have 
been found guilty of similar criminal conduct while 
maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized 
sentences when warranted . . . .25 
 
The real mother lode of policy goals, though, is found in 28 
U.S.C. § 994, which is directed at the Sentencing Commission and 
sets out with both great specificity26 and stunning breadth27 that 
which should be contained in the guidelines. 
Split into three distinct statutes, the policy goals taken as a whole 
suffer from redundancy and overlap in several places. To avoid 
replicating those problems and to provide a clearer analysis, I have 
grouped some of the sentencing policy goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553, 
28 U.S.C. § 991, and 28 U.S.C. § 994 into three categories. First, 
there are the broad dictates, which focus sentencing in a general way 
on interests other than the traditional goals, and which on their face 
should be considered in all federal sentencings. Second, there are 
specific provisions that require the consideration of certain discrete 
factors in sentencing defined types of cases. Third, federal law 
contains at least two statutes that might be called “trap-door” 
provisions, directing judges and the Commission to obey unnamed 
existing and yet-uncreated policy dictates. 
 
 24. For example, that statute’s requirement that sentencing guidelines “reflect, to the 
extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal 
justice process.” 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(C) (2006).  
 25. Id. § 991(b), (b)(1)(B). 
 26. E.g., that consecutive sentences for both an offense and conspiracy to commit that 
offense should be avoided. 28 U.S.C. § 994(l)(1)(B), 994(I)(2) (2006). 
 27. For example, these directives echo the others in seeking “fairness.” Id. at § 994(f). 
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1. Broad dictates 
The broad-dictate provisions of federal law direct sentencing 
towards general goals rather than specific objectives. This group 
includes several broader goals that in many cases undercut the four 
traditional goals including: uniformity; parsimony; following 
advancements in the science of human behavior, neutrality as to race, 
sex, national origin, creed, and socio-economic status; fairness; 
consistency with prior practices; certainty; the need to reflect 
community beliefs; consideration of the commonality of offenses; 
and the effect of the guidelines on prison populations.28 
a. Uniformity. Perhaps the most commonly recognized non-
traditional goal of sentencing is uniformity, which is codified as part 
of the long list found at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).29 In mandating 
sentencing guidelines, Congress sought, above all else, uniformity 
among judges and within a judge’s own docket in sentencing similar 
cases.30 As discussed in Part III at some length, the Department of 
Justice and some members of Congress straightforwardly declared 
uniformity as the paramount goal of the sentencing system. Indeed, 
it is fair to say that it is the pursuit of this goal of uniformity that has 
driven the restructuring of the federal sentencing system31 through 
guidelines, mandatory minimum sentences, and courts of appeals’ 
opinions on what is “reasonable” under United States v. Booker.32 
b. Parsimony.33 What is commonly called the “parsimony clause” 
of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) provides that “[t]he court shall impose a 
sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with 
the purposes set forth in . . . this subsection . . . .” This directive sets 
out a clear principle: a sentence should not exceed what is necessary 
 
 28. For a more complete list, see supra note 4. This list omits for the sake of efficiency 
some important codified principles that also create conflict, such as the principle of 
proportionality.  
 29. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2004). 
 30. As Stith and Cabranes described it, “Congress’s concern with reducing perceived or 
assumed disparities in federal sentencing is reflected in the debates leading up to the Act’s 
passage, in the Senate report accompanying it, and in the text of the Act itself.” STITH & 
CABRANES, supra note 6, at 104. 
 31. See Michael M. O’Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74 
U. CIN. L. REV. 749, 756–91 (2006). 
 32. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 33. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2004). 
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to fulfill codified factors, which include the traditional goals of 
retribution,34 deterrence,35 incapacitation,36 and rehabilitation.37  
Unfortunately, post-guideline courts have rarely tried to give the 
parsimony clause much meaning.38 It is not surprising that these 
courts have tended to ignore the parsimony clause, as trial courts 
generally follow the sentencing guidelines, which serve a multitude 
of other goals (and sometimes, seemingly, no goal at all). The 
guidelines are simply not calibrated to follow the simple parsimony 
directive, as Justice Breyer seemed to acknowledge in Rita v. United 
States.39 In that opinion, Justice Breyer noted that in the course of 
trying to use the four traditional goals and the parsimony provision 
to arrive at a foundational set of guidelines, a conflict arose among 
those drafting the guidelines “when the Commission attempted to 
reconcile the differing perceptions of the purposes of criminal 
punishment.”40 Rather than resolving this conflict, the Commission 
simply punted on the issue by codifying past practices and averaging 
out the results from thousands of prior cases.41 Thus, the 
Commission tossed out any real consideration of the parsimony 
provision as one of the structuring mechanisms for the guidelines. 
Yet, at the same time, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) affirmatively directed 
that judges consider the parsimony provision in sentencing individual 
defendants. 
Since the guidelines were developed without active reference to 
parsimony, the guidelines constantly conflicted with a sentencing 
judge’s attempt to use the parsimony provision as it applied to any 
specific case. Nevertheless, judges were both bound to the guidelines 
 
 34. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(A). 
 35. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(B). 
 36. Id. (a)(2)(C). 
 37. Id. (a)(2)(D). 
 38. It is important to distinguish the principle of parsimony from the rule of lenity, 
which historically has little to do with sentencing. Rather, the rule of lenity is a rule of 
statutory construction which insists that application of a criminal statute be construed in favor 
of a defendant when it is unclear whether or not that law applies to the defendant’s actions at 
all. See Phillip M. Spector, The Sentencing Rule of Lenity, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 511, 511–12 
(2002). 
 39. 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007). 
 40. Id. at 2464 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, intro. 3 
(2007)). 
 41. Id. 
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and charged with employing parsimony.42 These conflicts have 
continued even after the ruling in Booker that the guidelines were no 
longer mandatory, and it is likely that these conflicts will be litigated 
in the future as courts resolve what type of application of the 
parsimony clause is “reasonable.”43 While courts may have afforded 
little significance to the parsimony clause at some point in the past, 
more recent Supreme Court decisions point in the other direction.44 
In the future, parsimony will likely step up among the many other 
provisions competing for attention from the Sentencing Commission 
and judges. 
c. Following advancements in knowledge of human behavior.45 One 
of Congress’s principal directives to the Sentencing Commission was 
to establish policies that “reflect, to the extent practicable, 
advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the 
criminal justice process.”46 On its face, this directive tells the 
Commission that it must monitor scientific progress such as the 
development of new therapies that may promote rehabilitation. 
This has rarely occurred, which should not be surprising. Frank 
Bowman argues persuasively that the guidelines themselves are not 
only unscientific, but also constitute “a reaction against the notion 
that science has very much to say about criminal punishment.”47 In a 
broad sense, this is absolutely correct. The available history of the 
development of the guidelines reflects no substantive reference by 
the framers of the guidelines to the social or biological sciences. 
However, in some instances the Sentencing Commission itself has 
developed policies that rely on specific scientific findings. One such 
instance involves crack cocaine sentencing, in which two decades 
after adopting an unscientific approach the Commission reversed 
course based on scientific data.48 
 
 42. See Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 564 (2007); Gall v. United States, 
128 S. Ct. 586, 589–90 (2007) (arising out of this foundational conflict between, on the one 
hand, the traditional goals and the parsimony provision as applied by a judge and, on the 
other, the sentencing guidelines).  
 43. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 590. 
 44. See Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 564. 
 45. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(C) (2006). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Frank O. Bowman, Fear of Law: Thoughts on Fear of Judging and the State of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 299, 316 (2000). 
 48. Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 72 Fed. Reg. 28558, 28571–72 
(May 21, 2007). 
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In developing the sentencing guidelines for crack cocaine, the 
Sentencing Commission adopted the one-hundred-to-one powder-
to-crack cocaine ratio contained in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b),49 even 
though that ratio had no scientific foundation.50 In 200251 and in 
2007,52 the Commission issued lengthy reports that relied on current 
scientific studies to refute its own one-hundred-to-one ratio.53 In 
2007, the Commission ultimately adjusted that ratio in the 
guidelines based in part on the findings in its own report.54 The 
Commission made the adjustment despite the fact that Congress had 
taken no action to change that ratio as contained in the 
corresponding set of mandatory minimum sentences.55  
While some commentators and legal experts may dismiss the 
imperative of considering new science as toothless, in at least one 
high-profile sentencing realm (cocaine-related offenses), it has played 
a role in a major change. 
d. Neutrality as to race, sex, national origin, creed, and 
socioeconomic status.56 In one of the few absolutes among the 
directives by Congress, 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) mandates that “[t]he 
Commission shall assure that the guidelines and policy statements are 
entirely neutral as to the race, sex, national origin, creed, and 
socioeconomic status of offenders.” In turn, the Commission placed 
equally strong language in the guidelines themselves, providing flatly 
that race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, and socioeconomic 
status of a defendant are all factors that “are not relevant in the 
determination of a sentence.”57 
 
 49. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) creates mandatory minimum sentences which treat trafficking in 
one hundred grams of powder cocaine the same as trafficking just one gram of crack cocaine. 
 50. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL 
SENTENCING POLICY app. at B–5 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 COMM’N REPORT], available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/r_congress/cocaine2007.pdf. 
 51. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL 
SENTENCING POLICY, 21–29 (2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/r_congress/ 
02crack/2002crackrpt.htm. 
 52. 2007 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 50. 
 53. For example, the 2007 Report refutes the idea that crack cocaine affects fetal 
development disproportionately relative to powder cocaine. 2007 COMM’N REPORT, supra 
note 50, at 58–61. 
 54. Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 48. 
 55. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2000). 
 56. 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2006). 
 57. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.10 (2007). 
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The breadth of this prohibition is striking. Though it is 
contained within the chapter of the guidelines that describes 
departures from a guideline range,58 the language of this rule is 
distinct from surrounding guidelines, all of which limit their effects 
to departure considerations.59 In contrast, the prohibition against 
consideration of race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, and 
socioeconomic status applies to all aspects of determining a 
sentence—including the establishment of a sentence within a 
guideline range. In other words, by the plain language of the 
guideline, it is improper for a sentencing judge to even consider the 
fact that the defendant is female when sentencing within a guideline 
range. 
This absolutist nature of the rule of neutrality has brought the 
race/sex/national-origin/creed/religion/socioeconomic status ban 
into conflict with other policy directives. For example, the mandate 
to follow current science (discussed above) runs into a wall when it 
conflicts with the bar on consideration of these factors. Specifically, 
the idea of whether such science mandates consideration of a 
defendant’s sex is an actively debated question. In relation to female 
offenders, for example, some have employed reams of data to oppose 
the ban on taking gender into account when sentencing, arguing 
that this masks important and relevant gender factors that pervade 
society as a whole.60  
The strict bar on considering protected class status continues to 
have a strong impact on sentencing, even as it comes under harsher 
attack from those who would bend this rule to allow for certain 
factors (such as gender) to be taken into account.61  
 
 58. Id. §5. 
 59. E.g., id. § 5H1.5 (“Employment record is not ordinarily relevant in determining 
whether a departure is warranted.”).  
 60. See e.g., Myrna S. Raeder, Gender and Sentencing: Single Moms, Battered Women, 
and Other Sex-Based Anomalies in the Gender-Free World of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 
20 PEPP. L. REV. 905, 908 (1993). Using criminological data to back up her point, Raeder 
argues that “[t]reating men and women fungibly for sentencing purposes overlooks the role 
played by gender in criminality.” Id.; see also Nekima Levy-Pounds, From the Frying Pan into 
the Fire: How Poor Women of Color and Children Are Affected by Sentencing Guidelines and 
Mandatory Minimums, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 285, 286 (2007) (“[T]his approach has 
virtually ignored the disparate impact of the sentencing statutes on arguably the most 
vulnerable members of society—poor women of color and their children.”).  
 61. Despite the ban on considering gender, there does seem to be gender effects in 
sentencing, with women getting lighter sentences than similarly situated men. Anne Martin 
Stacey & Cassia Spohn, Gender and the Social Costs of Sentencing: An Analysis of Sentences 
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e. Fairness.62 Fairness, mandated as a part of the guideline scheme 
at both 28 U.S.C. §§ 991 and 994, seems so vague a concept that 
we might imagine it has not been a substantive policy issue in the 
grand debates over sentencing. However, as the Federal Sentencing 
Commission formed the guidelines, the Commission gave “fairness” 
two contradictory but precise meanings, and each plays a role in how 
the guidelines are constructed. 
In recounting the creation of the sentencing guidelines’ 
structure, now-Justice Stephen Breyer spoke quite clearly about 
some of the compromises made by the first Sentencing 
Commission.63 In that discussion, Breyer described fairness in two 
clear but opposing ways—first, in terms of procedural fairness and 
second, as substantive fairness.64  
To Breyer, procedural unfairness results when a judge determines 
facts that enhance a sentence in an informal way. For example, 
without jury determinations, the rules of evidence, or the 
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.65 As Breyer puts it, 
“the more facts the court must find in this informal way, the more 
unwieldy the process becomes, and the less fair that process appears 
to be.”66 Intriguingly, each of these shortcomings became a feature 
of the sentencing system, and they are at the core of the issues raised 
in Booker and its progeny.  
On the other hand, Breyer appears to believe that allowing the 
judge to adjust the range to account for “real” offense conduct (that 
is, acts beyond those charged in an indictment or information), 
almost always with a higher sentence, provides “substantive” fairness 
by allowing the punishment to fit the real crime.67 By including this 
principle in the sentencing scheme, the courts have given rise to 
 
Imposed on Male and Female Offenders in Three U.S. District Courts, 11 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 
43, 48–49, 73–76 (2006). 
 62. 28 U.S.C. §§ 991(b)(1)(B), 994(f) (2006).  
 63. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon 
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1988). 
 64. Id. at 8–12. 
 65. Id. at 10–11.  
 66. Id. at 11. 
 67. Id. at 11–12. 
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controversial features such as sentencing a defendant under the 
guidelines for crimes for which the defendant has been acquitted.68  
In the end, according to Breyer, the Commission compromised 
between these two types of fairness, essentially by allowing a limited 
version of both to play a role.69 The Commission’s compromise 
resulted in a number of troubling features in the guidelines, 
including the lack of jury findings, which brought us to Booker, and 
the crucial effect of relevant conduct in calculating a sentence.70 Far 
from being meaningless, the principle of “fairness” played a major 
role in shaping federal sentencing. In fact, it can be safely said that 
the Commission’s failure to give the idea of “fairness” a single and 
unique meaning within the mandated sentencing goals at the time 
the guidelines were framed (and thus requiring a “compromise”) was 
a major causal factor of the disruption within federal sentencing that 
we have experienced through Booker and its progeny. 
f. Consistency with prior practices.71 Congress directed the 
Commission to first survey the then-current sentences being given, 
and then to create guidelines that reject those averages and instead 
establish guideline ranges that “accurately reflect the seriousness of 
the offense.”72 In 28 U.S.C. § 994(m), Congress described this very 
specific mandate to the Sentencing Commission: 
The Commission shall insure that the guidelines reflect the 
fact that, in many cases, current sentences do not accurately 
reflect the seriousness of the offense. This will require that, as 
a starting point in its development of the initial sets of 
guidelines for particular categories of cases, the Commission 
ascertain the average sentences imposed in such categories of 
cases prior to the creation of the Commission . . . .73 
 
 68. See United States v. Lynch, 437 F.3d 902, 916 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“The 
Supreme Court has held that a jury’s verdict of acquittal does not prevent the sentencing court 
from considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge.”). 
 69. Breyer, supra note 63, at 11–12. 
 70. The guidelines expressly direct a court to consider uncharged “relevant conduct” in 
calculating a guideline sentence, which means that acts never charged will be the basis of 
sentencing if they are found to have been committed by the judge under a mere 
preponderance standard. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 (2007). 
 71. 28 U.S.C. § 994(m) (2006). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
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Indeed, Congress directly told the Sentencing Commission to 
ascertain the collective judgment of hundreds of experienced judges 
and to substitute it with their own.  
It is beyond dispute that the Commission did exactly that, in an 
imprecise, contentious, and hurried way.74 First, the Commission 
gathered data on past practices. Experts in statistical analysis, 
however, have criticized the Commission’s methods. These experts 
contend that these methods did not meet social science standards, 
focused on a small number of relevant variables, and were shrouded 
in mystery even to those with an expertise in such analysis.75  
Having gathered and analyzed this data, the Commission 
followed Congress’s mandate to reject the content of that data. 
Among other adjustments from prior practice, the Commission 
significantly raised sentences under the guidelines for violent crimes, 
white-collar crimes, and narcotics crimes.76 
It is hard to underestimate the profound impact or bizarre nature 
of the task given the Sentencing Commission: to assess then reject 
accumulated wisdom. The first step, a comprehensive study of 
existing practices, certainly makes sense. The second step, however, 
seems inexplicable—not to consider those prior practices, or hold 
them up against an objective standard, but rather to reject them. A 
single obscure command from Congress told the Commission both 
to gather data for the first time, draw a specific conclusion about that 
data (that it represents under-punishment of some crimes), and to 
take action on that fore-drawn conclusion (raise sentences for those 
crimes). This process is bizarre not only in that it is devoid of respect 
for social science, but it also negates any consideration of the many 
other sentencing goals Congress mandated at the same time. The 
directive to assess current practice and crank it up a notch does not 
take into account parsimony, has nothing to do with science, 
probably incorporates sexist and racist assumptions, and reflects 
neither procedural nor substantive fairness. It was, however, 
relatively easy to do. 
 
 74. See Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Ne’er-Do-Well to the Criminal History Category: 
The Refinement of the Actuarial Model in Criminal Law, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 
122–23 (2003) (“The final draft was written at a late date in some haste to meet the 
submission deadline.”), quoted in MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 88 (1996). 
 75. Harcourt, supra note 74, at 99, 123.  
 76. Id. at 125–26.  
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g. Certainty.77 In the sense the guidelines made sentencing more 
predictable and “certain” from the perspective of a defendant being 
sentenced, the very act of creating guidelines in part fulfilled the 
mandate of 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B), which required the 
Sentencing Commission to establish policies and practices that 
provide “certainty” in meeting the purposes of sentencing. Justice 
Breyer called this factor “honesty,” and described it as one in which 
“the sentence the judge gives is the sentence the offender will serve  
. . . .”78 It is noteworthy, however, that the elimination of parole and 
drastic reductions in “good time” credit to those who had already 
been sentenced have been even more significant to the achievement 
of certainty than the sentencing guidelines.  
This project as a whole is perhaps best understood through the 
guidelines’ own description of “The Basic Approach.”79 There, the 
Commission explained its understanding of such certainty, relative to 
the regime it replaced: 
Congress first sought honesty in sentencing. It sought to 
avoid the confusion and implicit deception that arises out of 
the present sentencing system which requires a judge to 
impose an indeterminate sentence that is automatically 
reduced in most cases by “good time” credits. In addition, 
the parole commission is permitted to determine how much 
of the remainder of any prison sentence an offender actually 
will serve.80 
Eliminating parole81 and limiting “good time” credit to fifteen 
percent of the total sentence,82 while not directly related to the 
guidelines, nonetheless had an impact on the operation of the 
guidelines and the problems that resulted. By determining the term 
of imprisonment in whole at the time of sentencing (rather than 
being subject to later revision by parole boards and the Bureau of 
Prisons), the sentence issued in the judgment became more 
important. Thus a sentence’s distortions and anomalies, including 
those caused by the confusion cloud of policy goals discussed in this 
Article, were amplified. 
 
 77. 28 U.S.C. §§ 991(b)(1)(B), 994(f) (2006). 
 78. Breyer, supra note 63, at 4.  
 79. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1(A)(3) (2007).  
 80. Id. 
 81. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(a) (2006). 
 82. Id. § 3624(b). 
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Where there were previously multiple opportunities to achieve 
the goals of sentencing, the elimination of parole and “good time” 
meant that now there was only one—the sentencing itself. Without 
the possible mitigating effects of parole and good time, only the 
courtroom judge (and the Sentencing Commission directing the 
judge via the guidelines) was left to directly effectuate the many and 
conflicting goals of sentencing articulated by Congress. 
h. Reflecting community beliefs.83 Among the many sentencing 
goals that promote national standards and uniformity, there is a 
striking anomaly: 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(4) directs that the guidelines 
shall take into account to the extent it is relevant “the community 
view of the gravity of the offense.”84 While this goal is not explicitly 
reflected in the guidelines themselves, the guidelines’ structure and 
related statutes provide a great deal of discretion to localized federal 
prosecutors. Stephanos Bibas has chronicled the significance of these 
local variations through prosecutorial discretion,85 which the 
Sentencing Commission has continued to allow. For example, Bibas 
specifically describes significant variations in the way that different 
federal prosecutors employ substantial assistance departures.86 Such 
localized variations, of course, undermine many of the other goals 
described here. Most obviously, they cuts against uniformity, the 
goal some legal experts and scholars see as first among many.87 
i. Commonality of the offense.88 The Commission is charged in 28 
U.S.C. § 994(c)(7) with crafting guidelines that take into account 
(where relevant) “the current incidence of the offense in the 
community and in the Nation as a whole.” Admittedly, the 
Commission has certainly followed this instruction, at least when the 
Commission reacts to the emergence of a new narcotic. Often, this 
has been in response to a direct Congressional directive. This 
dynamic is exemplified by the Commission’s recent treatment of 
anabolic steroids. 
 
 83. 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(4) (2006). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Stephanos Bibas, Regulating Local Variations in Federal Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. 
REV. 137 (2005). 
 86. Id. at 148–53. 
 87. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 6, at 104 (“Reduction of ‘unwarranted sentencing 
disparities’ was a—probably the—goal of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.”). 
 88. 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(7) (2006). 
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In February 2004, Attorney General John Ashcroft personally 
announced the indictment of several men connected with the 
BALCO lab in San Francisco who were charged with making and 
selling steroids.89 President Bush even denounced steroid use in his 
State of the Union address that year,90 and subsequently Senator 
John McCain and others promoted bills in Congress that would 
require mandatory uniform testing of professional athletes for the 
use of anabolic steroids.91 Clearly, the nation’s politicians perceived a 
growing epidemic of steroid use. 
Consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(7), Congress then directed 
the United States Sentencing Commission to consider an increase to 
the amount of prison time required under the steroid guidelines.92 
The Sentencing Commission took this advice and acted by bumping 
up the guidelines’ sentence for a given amount of steroids.93 
Whether or not there was an upsurge of steroid use around 2004, 
the guidelines reacted to the perception that there was such a relevant 
change in the commonality of that particular type of drug abuse. 
Indeed, the Commission’s actions in increasing prison time for 
steroid offenses reflect yet another Congressional directive to 
sentencing. 
j. Effect on prison populations.94 When the Sentencing 
Commission first created the guidelines, Congress ordered that the 
Commission, in conjunction with the Bureau of Prisons, report to 
Congress on the “maximum utilization of resources to deal 
effectively with the Federal prison population.”95 This implies, at 
least, that the Commission is directed to impose guidelines with an 
eye to the effect that the guidelines will have on prison 
populations—that is, to avoid the need for a prison-building binge 
due to the impact of sentencing guidelines. 
 
 89. See Richard D. Collins, Of Ballparks and Jail Yards: Pumping Up the War on 
Steroids, 30 CHAMPION 22 (2006). 
 90. See id. 
 91. Lindsay J. Taylor, Congressional Attempts to “Strike Out” Steroids: Constitutional 
Concerns About the Clean Sports Act, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 961, 961–62 (2007). 
 92. Anabolic Steroid Control Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-358, 118 Stat. 1661, § 3 
(2004) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801, 802, 811 (2004)).  
 93. The Commission achieved this increase by adjusting the dosage amount for steroids. 
Collins, supra note 89, at 23. 
 94. 28 U.S.C. § 994(q) (2006). 
 95. Id. 
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It is unclear that this implication has had much effect. Prior to 
the guidelines, about four in ten federal offenders went to prison.96 
By 2006, that number was 9.5 out of 10.97 Twenty-some years down 
the guideline path, nearly all defendants are going to prison. 
Predictably, the federal prison population shot up. In 1984, there 
were 32,317 people in federal prisons.98 By 1992, that figure had 
doubled, and in 2007 the federal prison population stood at a 
shocking 198,65699—six times the population at the time the 
Commission created the guidelines. 
Unlike the other broad directives discussed above, it appears that 
the mandate to consider prison populations had little direct effect on 
the guidelines themselves. However, while there has been no 
significant effect on the guidelines,100 the directive to consider prison 
populations may have been influential in other ways. Indeed, it is 
possible that the Commission’s reports have deterred Congress from 
passing some laws that might have had a drastic effect on prison 
populations. For example, in analyzing the proposed Gang 
Deterrence and Community Protection Act of 2007, the 
Commission reported that the act would create the need for nine 
billion dollars to construct about 23,600 additional prison beds.101 It 
is easy to imagine that during tough economic times, the 
Commission’s reports dampened the chances for the passage of that 
bill. 
 
 96. See Timothy P. Cadigan, Pretrial Services in the Federal System: Impact of the Pretrial 
Services Act of 1982, 71 FED. PROBATION 10, 13 (2007).  
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Guideline changes have increased sentences relentlessly, despite the directive to keep 
prison populations stable. From 1988 (the beginning of the guideline era) until 1999, for 
example, the percentage of federal defendants sent to prison pursuant to the guidelines 
increased from 54% to 72%. By 2003, this rate was up to 83.3%. Nora V. Demleitner, Smart 
Public Policy: Replacing Imprisonment with Targeted Nonprison Sentences and Collateral 
Sanctions, 58 STAN. L. REV. 339, 340 & n.4 (2005). 
 101. Tiffany Sykes, Note, Much Ado About Something: Reconciling Roper v. Simmons 
with the Gang Deterrence and Community Protection Act of 2007 and the Possibility of 
Inconsistent Jurisprudence, 34 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 163, 171 (2008) 
(citing Jeffery A. Kidder, Gang Deterrence and the Community Protection Act of 2005: Why the 
Federal Response to MS-13 is Flawed and How it Will Have an Adverse Impact on Your State, 33 
NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 639, 648 n.85 (2007)). 
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2. Specific provisions 
Unlike the broad dictates (group one) and the trap-door 
provisions (group three), the second group of policy goals contains 
specific provisions, which require the consideration of discrete factors 
under certain circumstances. This section addresses some of 
Congress’s policy goals that apply only to certain types of cases. 
Accordingly, this section discusses only a fraction of the total 
number of these specific sentencing goals, namely, restitution, harsh 
punishments for certain crimes, and rewarding cooperators. 
a. Restitution. In concert with the creation of the guidelines, 
Congress directed that a court in a case involving robbery, for 
example, consider the need for the defendant to “provide restitution 
to any victims of the offense.”102 The guidelines, consistent with the 
statute,103 direct that the payment of restitution be required for the 
full amount of the victim’s loss,104 even if restitution would reduce 
the amount of a fine.105 
Conceivably, this commitment to restitution would cut against 
the need for a sentence of imprisonment, so that the defendant 
would be free to work and earn money in order to pay off the 
restitution amount. This tradeoff—disfavoring prison for probation 
where restitution is possible—seems to be in tension with some of 
the other principles articulated above, including the call to 
uniformity106 and the ban on considering socioeconomic status.107 
b. Harsh punishment for certain crimes.108 18 U.S.C. § 994(h) 
created what we now know as the career-offender provisions of the 
guidelines.109 These provisions advise harsh punishments for 
defendants charged with drug crimes or crimes of violence and who 
have at least two such prior convictions.110 These offenders receive a 
 
 102. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(7) (2006). 
 103. 18 U.S.C. § 3572(b) (2006). 
 104. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5E1.1(a) (2007). 
 105. Id. § 5E1.1(c). 
 106. There would be conflict because in otherwise similar cases, defendants with the 
ability to pay would receive probation, while those with lesser job skills might end up in prison. 
 107. Presumably, socioeconomic status relates to earning power, which will equate to a 
greater ability to pay restitution if the defendant receives a sentence of probation. 
 108. 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (2006). 
 109. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1 (2007). 
 110. Id. § 4B1.1(a). 
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stiff upward adjustment not only in their offense level score,111 but in 
the other axis of the sentencing grid, the criminal history category, 
regardless of their actual criminal history.112 Thus, an offender with 
three minor drug trafficking offenses spread over two decades may 
end up with a more severe sentence than some drug kingpins, such 
as those who arrange for large amounts of narcotics to be brought 
into the United States. As set out in the next section, this creates a 
direct conflict with the competing principle of parsimony.113 
c. Rewarding cooperators.114 Congress further mandated that the 
guidelines encourage cooperation with the government through the 
promise of lower sentences and the waiver of mandatory minimum 
sentence provisions for those who provide the government with 
“substantial assistance.”115 This mandate was fulfilled in the 
guidelines through the provisions at section 5K1.1, which allow 
downward departures for cooperators. These authorized departures 
are now particularly important in federal criminal law, as they not 
only are an essential tool for prosecutors, but the departures also 
hold out for many defendants the only hope to escape harsh 
mandatory minimum sentencing provisions.116 
By making the breaks given to cooperators so important within 
federal sentencing, Congress and the Commission sacrifice the hope 
of fulfilling certain of the other principles they have set out. 
Uniformity, of course, loses out, as does neutrality as to race and 
socioeconomic class.117  
 
 111. Id. § 4B1.1(b). The sentencing guidelines arrive at a range of possible terms of 
incarceration through a matrix which reflects on one axis the severity of the offense (the 
“offense score”) and on the other axis the prior criminal convictions of the defendant (the 
“criminal history category”).   
 112. Id. 
 113. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 114. 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (2006). 
 115. Id. 
 116. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2006). 
 117. Those defendants with access to other defendants, often through bonds of race and 
class, have the best chance of successfully getting a break for cooperating with federal 
investigators. Many, though not all, conspiracies, for example, consist of members of one 
ethnic group, meaning that only members of that group will have access to information and 
the chance to cooperate. 
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3. Trap-door provisions 
A final category of congressional requirement would be trap-
door provisions. These provisions allow for an unlimited number of 
additional policy provisions to enter into the calculations that 
supposedly determine a federal sentence. Federal law contains two 
primary trap doors: (1) allowing Congress to introduce unforeseen 
principles into the sentencing scheme through further directives118 
and (2) allowing the Sentencing Commission to introduce new 
directions.119 This allows both bodies to develop even more guiding 
principles on the fly, as though the welter of provisions we already 
have is insufficient.120 
In a sense, the trap-door provisions may tell us more about the 
problems with the federal sentencing project than anything else. Not 
content with having created numerous distinct and competing policy 
principles, Congress reserved the right to create even more policy 
principles and inject them into an already confused and effectively 
random system of sentencing. 
III. THE PROBLEMS OF POINTLESSNESS AND UNIFORMITY 
The listings above only describe less than half of the policies 
embedded in federal sentencing statutes, but those described here 
illustrate the flawed policy dynamic at work—one where so many 
policy strands are knit together that the resulting fabric resembles 
none of them. This Part first explores just a few of the resulting 
conflicts within this mess, and then describes the effect of combining 
this project with a consistent and unyielding desire (on the part of 
Congress) for uniformity.  
A. The Conflicts Within the Policy Swamp 
While describing some of the policies involved in federal 
sentencing and the guidelines, I have mentioned a few of the 
conflicts created when these policy goals conflict. I would like now 
to evaluate a few more in order to exemplify the workings of these 
conflicts at ground level. I am able to describe only a small fraction 
of the total conflicts; at some level, of course, each of the policy 
 
 118. 28 U.S.C. § 994(m) (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5) (2006). 
 119. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5) (2006). 
 120. See supra Part II.B.1.i. 
OSLER.PP3 3/13/2009 9:18 AM 
293 Congress’s Sentencing Acid Trip 
 315 
goals opposes all the others for primacy in affecting the sentence of 
any given defendant.121  
1. Parsimony v. harsh punishment for certain offenders 
The principle of parsimony, as described above,122 requires that a 
sentence should be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to 
comply with the traditional sentencing goals.123 Congress chose to 
place this principle at the heart of its description of the sentencing 
process.124 
At the same time, however, Congress created the career-offender 
provisions125 to help direct especially harsh sentences for those 
convicted of a narcotics offense or violent crimes who also have two 
prior convictions for drug trafficking or violent crimes.126 The career-
offender provision serves as a particularly blunt instrument since it 
covers both drug kingpins and those who have three relatively minor 
convictions for selling small amounts of narcotics.127 
It is not hard to see how these two policies conflict.128 If the 
career offender provision is followed, in many cases it will run 
contrary to the parsimony provision, which requires more 
individualized consideration. A good example of this conflict was 
described in United States v. Fernandez,129 in which the district judge 
considered a defendant who qualified as a career offender, based on 
two relatively minor prior convictions.130 The judge in Fernandez 
noted that the career-offender provisions applied but would double 
the sentence.131 The judge then rejected the application of those 
 
 121. Tensions exist, of course, even within the original four goals of sentencing. 
However, with a much more limited number of goals, those tensions can be much more easily 
evaluated than with the huge number we wrestle with in the current system. 
 122. See supra Part II.B.1.b. 
 123. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). 
 124. Id. 
 125. See supra Section II.B.2.b. 
 126. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1(a) (2007). 
 127. Id. 
 128. The parsimony provision, of course, conflicts with a number of other policies as 
well. For example, it conflicts with the directive to base the guidelines on prior experience, 
which may not reflect parsimony. Parsimony also conflicts with the desire for guidelines to 
reflect community beliefs, which may exaggerate the threat posed by a given category of crime 
based on sensationalistic media reports. 
 129. 436 F. Supp. 2d 983 (E.D. Wis. 2006). 
 130. Id. at 987. 
 131. Id. at 990. 
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provisions, as “the advisory guideline range was greater than 
necessary to satisfy the purposes of sentencing.”132 Other judges 
seem to be reaching the same conclusion,133 a result which, over 
time, will erode the uniformity sought by the career-offender 
provision.134 
2. Neutrality v. consistency with prior sentencing practices 
If the guidelines clearly state anything, it is that both the 
guidelines themselves and sentencing judges are to be strictly neutral 
as to race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status.135 
Nonetheless, Congress decreed that the starting point for creating 
the new guidelines be a survey of existing practices (which would 
then be adjusted upward).136  
In basing the guidelines on prior practices, the Commission 
actually filtered those practices for racial, gender, and other 
disparities. In other words, the guidelines, while expressing strict 
neutrality, began with the simple step of building into the guidelines’ 
structure any bias and prejudice that may have existed in the 
sentencing practices of the judges who were surveyed.137 
3. Certainty v. rewarding cooperators 
The federal sentencing scheme changed drastically at the time 
the guidelines were first employed. This change was due in part to 
the initial emphasis on certainty of sentencing at the time sentence is 
announced, achieved in large part by eliminating parole and 
diminishing the effect of “good time” credit.138 At the same time, 
 
 132. Id.  
 133. E.g., United States v. Ortiz, 502 F. Supp. 2d 712, 714 (N.D. Ohio 2007); United 
States v. Vigorito, No. 4:04-CR-00011, 2007 WL 4125914, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 20, 
2007). 
 134. One could argue that the erosion of one congressional mandate by judicial action is 
not an inherent conflict, but rather a dialogue. Remember, however, that the provisions of 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a) (including the parsimony provision) are meant as well to direct the 
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (2006). 
 135. 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2006). 
 136. 28 U.S.C. § 994(m) (2006). 
 137. One exception to this general observation is that the directive to adjust under-
punished crimes (18 U.S.C. § 994(m)) was employed to raise sentences for white-collar 
criminals and, as a result, may have countered a pre-existing bias in favor of the wealthy as a 
socioeconomic group. See Breyer, supra note 63, at 20–23. 
 138. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2006). 
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Congress insisted that defendants who assist the prosecution be 
rewarded for their efforts with a break in their sentences.139 
The tension between these two directives comes from the fact 
that many cooperators are rewarded with a break on their term of 
incarceration after they are sentenced, as is authorized by Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b). Thus, certainty at the time of 
sentencing is undone. In fact, the amount of uncertainty created by 
the resentencing of cooperators is exacerbated by the fact that the 
guidelines do not restrict the size of a departure once the court has 
found that the defendant provided “substantial assistance.”140 Thus, 
the complete freedom of judges to alter the sentence as much as they 
want gives them as much power as the parole board had before 
parole was abolished.141 
Needless to say, this Article has discussed just a thimbleful from 
the swamp of conflicts created by the fact that at least thirty-one 
policy goals fight for attention in the realm of federal sentencing. 
The failure to articulate a reasonable set of goals robs the guideline 
system of any hope of moral authority. There is no way to measure 
success when so many factors are in play and in tension. By its 
nature, a system with so many goals has the moral trajectory of a toy 
boat in a baby pool being splashed by a group of toddlers. At the 
heart of one of our most important governmental functions, we have 
nothing less than moral relativism, where a virtually limitless set of 
principles are at play with no sorting mechanism at hand. 
B. The Dangerous Combination: Uniformity and Pointlessness 
Federal sentencing policy is not a policy at all; it is a grab-bag of 
too many ideas and priorities. On its own, this could be seen as 
typical of congressional action in many areas where it creates an 
administrative agency and then hands off power to that agency. 
Congress is free in those circumstances to decree what is important 
by laying out guiding principles, and then leave the messy work of 
implementation to others—such is the structure of our government. 
What is perhaps unusual about sentencing, though, is that in 
 
 139. 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (2006). 
 140. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2007). 
 141. The analogy to a parole board is not a tight fit, of course, since the judge reviewing 
a defendant’s assistance after sentencing will often be the same person who issued the initial 
sentence, and looks to different criteria that a parole board would. The analogy is apposite only 
in that certainty at the point in time of judgment is undermined. 
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creating the guidelines and the Sentencing Commission, there was 
also an overarching goal at work—the desire to achieve uniform 
sentences from case to case and from judge to judge.142 To anyone 
paying attention, it is perfectly clear that Congress’s primary 
sentencing goal has been the same for the past twenty years: 
eliminate disparities and create uniform sentences across the 
nation.143  
Congress has attempted to achieve this goal through the 
imposition of sentencing guidelines, the passage of mandatory 
minimum sentences,144 and the reporting of individual judges’ 
sentences to the United States Sentencing Commission for 
evaluation.145  Intriguingly, within the debate over sentencing, 
uniformity is consistently discussed as an end in itself rather than as a 
tool to best fulfill other policies.146 The result, even after Booker, has 
been the most restrictive sentencing system in the nation—one that 
imposes more uniformity and restricts judicial discretion more 
severely than any of the fifty state systems that overlap with federal 
courts in their common project of regulating crime.147  
Certainly, one can make the argument (and Albert Altschuler has 
made it quite convincingly)148 that despite these efforts, uniformity 
has not been achieved. Altschuler points out that regional disparities 
tripled after the guidelines went into effect, rather than decreasing as 
intended.149 He further argues that disparities as a whole increased in 
the first fifteen years of the guidelines’ existence.150 In explaining this 
unexpected result, Altschuler credibly points to the use of 
 
 142. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 6, at 104. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2006). 
 145. These reports are made within thirty days of the entry of judgment in every federal 
case, and are mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 994(w)(1). 
 146. For example, in the Kimbrough opinion on crack cocaine sentencing, even while 
acknowledging that Booker marked a departure from strict uniformity, the Supreme Court 
simply stated without elaboration that “it is unquestioned that uniformity remains an 
important goal of sentencing.” Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 573 (2007). 
 147. See Kevin R. Reitz, The Enforceability of Sentencing Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 
155 (2005). 
 148. Albert W. Altschuler, Disparity: The Normative and Empirical Failure of the Federal 
Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85 (2005). 
 149. Id. at 101. 
 150. Id.  
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prosecutorial discretion in far different ways in different parts of the 
country.151 
Whether the desire for uniformity has been achieved, uniformity 
would never have made sense in the first place unless those uniform 
results were consistent with understandable, limited, and discrete 
goals. The failure to articulate a simple set of goals before imposing 
the machinery of uniformity (mandatory minimums and the current 
federal guidelines) had two major effects. First, this failure robbed 
the guidelines of a clear-cut measuring tool for success. Second, this 
failure amplified the problems associated with the lack of a moral 
compass described in the preceding section152 by prescribing bright 
normative lines that are unmoored from a simple, understandable 
moral anchor. In other words, the guidelines lack any 
understandable purpose, yet are strongly directive.  
1. The unmeasurable goals 
Like a sports league for six-year-olds where the score is not kept 
because it might make one of the teams feel bad, Congress has 
created a system in which cause and effect cannot be measured, 
which results in unaccountability. Having a huge number of 
conflicting policy goals makes it almost impossible to measure the 
success of progress towards any one of those goals.153 Even the goal 
of uniformity, which should be simple to measure, seems not to have 
worked out the way people hoped, or to be easy to measure.154 As 
Amy Baron-Evans points out, fifteen years after the guidelines were 
imposed, it was still unclear whether the increased severity of the 
guidelines155 had accomplished any sentencing purpose.156 Thus we 
 
 151. Id. at 100−02. Stephanos Bibas describes in some detail the way in which this works 
as to two components of judicial discretion—the use of fast-track programs and employment of 
substantial assistance departures. Bibas, supra note 85, at 137–39.  
 152. See supra Part III.A. 
 153. William Stuntz has compellingly described the natural tendency to constantly 
increase the number of crimes on the books to the point where the criminal code is so broad 
that it covers an astonishing array of activities, to the point where the penal code becomes 
almost indeterminate. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. 
L. REV. 505, 534, 542−43, 547−58 (2001). What I critique here is distinct but parallel to that 
analysis; I am making the same argument as to Congress’s policy goals as articulated in statute. 
The two intersect, of course; those policy goals at times will serve as justification for expanding 
the penal code as well as increasing guideline ranges. 
 154. See Altschuler, supra note 148, at 100−03. 
 155. See supra Part II.B.1.f. 
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are left with a guideline structure created with no clear relationship 
to its founding principles (other, perhaps, than uniformity), and 
which continues to function without an ability to measure a 
relationship to those founding principles.  
The sentencing guidelines are not a success. The goals they aim 
to meet are so numerous that they defy any effort to analyze data 
that may measure failure or success.157 Much like a bizarre game of 
Chinese checkers that thirty-one people can play at the same time, it 
is extremely difficult to figure out what is going on. 
2. Harshness in the service of nothing 
Because the guidelines are pointless, they cannot be rational in 
relationship to any discrete sentencing goal. Yet, in striving for 
uniformity, Congress has made them uniformly harsh. On a 
playground, the combination of irrationality combined with 
harshness is a bully looking to pick on those with less power. The 
same combination in our federal sentencing scheme produces a 
system, a machine really, that resembles that playground bully—
unreasoning, uncompassionate, and unprincipled.  
This moral relativism born of too many goals is especially sad in 
an era where very often criminal law is said to be about “sending 
messages.”158 Those signals are, or should be, moral signals about 
the bounds of socially acceptable behavior, and the price to be paid 
for differentiated acts (which is what the guidelines are about—
normative price-setting for specific wrongful acts). Included in these 
signals are messages about why an act is especially reprehensible. 
Without a set of clear policy goals behind it, sentencing practice loses 
the value of this important function. In fact, it seems that if there is 
one message conveyed to the public under the contemporary 
scheme, it is one of simple retribution for any type of crime, a 
 
 156. Amy Baron-Evans, The Continuing Struggle for Just, Effective and Constitutional 
Sentencing After United States v. Booker: Why and How the Guidelines Do Not Comply With § 
3553(a), CHAMPION, Sept.–Oct. 2006, at 32, 34−35. 
 157. The problem is not a simple lack of data relative to sentencing—the Sentencing 
Commission has produced thousands of pages of data relative to sentencing in the federal 
courts. See United States Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing Statistics by State, 
District, and Circuit, http://www.ussc.gov/linktojp.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2009). Rather, 
the problem is that it is impossible to analyze that data so that it can reveal how any one of the 
tens of policy goals are being fulfilled.  
 158. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 
480 (1999); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 18−27 (2000). 
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message inconsistent with much (though certainly not all) of what 
Congress has articulated as the policy goals159 of the guidelines.160  
In particular, this perceived message of widespread, consistent, 
and harsh retribution is at odds with the parsimony principle that 
Congress has established as the fulcrum of a trial court’s sentencing 
mechanism.161 This provision specifically demands that a sentencing 
judge impose a sentence “not greater than necessary” to accomplish 
the aims of the four traditional sentencing goals.162 Beyond the 
necessary balancing between sentencing goals and parsimony, the 
claim that retribution is the primary goal ignores the other goals that 
can often be seen pulling the other way—including the findings of 
social science,163 the idea of fairness (either procedural or 
substantive),164 the effect of mass incarceration on prison 
populations,165 the need to encourage restitution,166 and the benefits 
given to often highly culpable cooperators under guideline § 
5K1.1.167 
This cry of retribution, while not supported by Congress’s 
articulated sentencing goals as a whole, does accurately reflect the 
general harshness of the federal scheme.168 Were the guidelines to be 
underpinned by a reasonable and understandable principle or set of 
principles, harshness (or surprising lenience) might be a cost worth 
paying. However, when we cannot say that uniformity or any other 
goal is being achieved, it may be time to seek change. 
 
 159. See supra Part II.  
 160. In addition, this message is inconsistent with what highly selective federal 
prosecutors actually do. Federal prosecutors handle less than 5% of the nation’s felonies, with 
the rest going to the state systems. The great majority of these could have been tried at either 
the state or federal level. See Stuntz, supra note 153, at 542−43 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS—1988, 
at 387−88 tbl.5.6 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1999)). 
 161. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). 
 162. Id. 
 163. See supra Part II.B.1.c. 
 164. See supra Part II.B.1.e. 
 165. See supra Part II.B.1.j. 
 166. See supra Part II.B.2.a. 
 167. See supra Part II.B.2.c. 
 168. For a good description of the mechanisms that lead to harsher sentences in the 
federal system, see Frank O. Bowman III, Pour Encourager Les Autres? The Curious History 
and Distressing Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 
Sentencing Guidelines Amendments that Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373, 387−91 
(2004). 
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IV. INTO THE POINTLESS FOREST 
If the guideline system is pointless and amoral, should it matter 
that it is no longer mandatory?169 Certainly, the effects of Booker 
may, over time, mitigate some of the harms created by the guidelines 
by allowing sentencing judges more discretion. However, the 
sentencing guidelines are still at the center of the process of 
sentencing in federal court. As Booker made clear, the mechanisms of 
sentencing are the same—including revision of the guidelines and 
calculation of a guideline range in nearly every case.170 Therefore, it is 
fair to say that the guidelines have less authority but still play a major 
role in federal sentencing. The critique above171 applies regardless of 
whether the guidelines are mandatory, advisory, or somewhere in 
between. Do we want an irrational and pointless construct at the 
center of our sentencing structure, even if it is not strictly 
mandatory? I would hope not. So long as the guidelines remain at 
the center of the mechanism for sentencing, they should be tethered 
to a few understandable and easily articulated principles. 
If there is to be change (and there should), it seems there are 
three options: (1) abolish the guidelines and return to the system 
that existed before they were created; (2) keep the guidelines as they 
are but change the underlying policy statements; or (3) start over 
and build new guidelines on top of a few, well-articulated policy 
goals.  
First, Congress could scrap the guidelines altogether and go back 
to a system in which judges have unguided discretion within broad 
statutory limits. While this might solve some of the problems 
associated with the system as it exists, it seems politically unlikely 
given the sentiment in Congress for retaining some measure of 
uniformity in federal sentencing.  
A second option would be for Congress to restrict the statutory 
goals of sentencing to the traditional goals (deterrence, retribution, 
rehabilitation, and incapacitation) while leaving the guidelines in 
place, hoping that they evolve into something better over time. One 
could read this Article (at least up to this point) as an argument for 
doing exactly that—limiting the sentencing policy goals to a few 
understandable points. However, while the need for fewer and 
 
 169. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 265−68 (2005).  
 170. Id. at 264−65. 
 171. See supra Parts II & III. 
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simpler goals is certainly a part of my argument, redefining the goals 
of sentencing would not make much sense unless the guidelines 
themselves were either revised or removed from federal sentencing. 
Unfortunately, the guidelines are now filled with the numerical 
results of thousands of actions taken on behalf of one or another of 
the goals described above. It would be impossible to undo the moral 
relativism of the guidelines system without taking them apart and 
remaking them in a better and more understandable fashion. 
Finally, Congress could start the process over again with fewer 
goals and advisory guidelines written from scratch. If we are to have 
principled, understandable sentencing in the federal courts, this 
might be the single best politically palatable option. 
A. A Project for Principles: Rewrite the Guidelines 
Unless we are comfortable with the amoral strictness of the 
guidelines we have, they must be remade. But, is it possible to take 
apart the guidelines and remake them? To do so would require a 
massive effort involving a new guideline commission charged with 
coming up with federal sentencing guidelines from scratch. Yet still, 
this undertaking might be worthwhile. A second-generation 
sentencing commission starting with a clean sheet of paper would 
have significant advantages over the group that came up with the 
first edition. 
For one, a new founding commission would have the advantage 
of learning from the problems with the current guidelines. For 
example, it would allow for the thorough rethinking of charge versus 
real-offense conduct as the basis for sentencing. The original 
Sentencing Commission’s compromise on this issue allowing a judge 
to consider relevant conduct, including acquitted conduct,172 has 
been (properly) subjected to withering criticism for importing into 
the current system, without context, a single feature of a bygone era 
in which rehabilitation was a primary goal of sentencing.173 In 
relation to this, a new commission would have the benefit of the 
reams of data gathered by the Sentencing Commission staff over the 
 
 172. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 (2007). 
 173. Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits 
on the Discretion of Sentences, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1712−13 (1992); Osler, Must Have Got 
Lost, supra note 16, at 669−70. 
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past two decades. This, combined with other social science data, 
would broaden the perspective of these second-generation framers. 
Second, the new commission would be positioned to learn from 
the examples provided by several states with advisory guidelines in 
place. The first Commission looked only at the example of 
Minnesota and Washington, both of whom had fairly new guideline 
regimes at that time and seemed to summarily reject them as too 
simplistic.174 Now, however, there have been two decades of 
guideline experiments in a number of states, all of which provide 
trial-and-error lessons for a new federal system. 
Third, starting from scratch at this point would allow the new 
commission to draw from the body of scholarship that has developed 
since the mid-1980s by writers such as Douglas Berman, Michael 
O’Hear, Frank Bowman, Steven Chanenson, and Stephanos Bibas, 
each of whom has had a significant impact on the development of 
this field.175 
Finally, a new commission would have the advantage of a limited 
and understandable group of directive principles. Part of the 
legislation creating a new guideline Commission could start by 
phasing out 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), 28 U.S.C. § 991 and 28 U.S.C. § 
994 in favor of a much briefer articulation of goals. It might be that 
the parsimony provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), plus the four 
traditional sentencing goals, would serve this purpose176 if Congress 
expressly made these policies the basis for guidelines in an active way, 
freed from the command to place sharp limits on judges and increase 
sentences. 
B. Change as the Pointless Forest 
Predictably, there are those who would oppose any change in the 
essential structure of the sentencing guidelines, especially given the 
strong likelihood that the revision would result in greater judicial 
discretion. Those who gain the most from the current regime (that 
is, the Department of Justice) would raise the strongest objections. 
The present system gives tremendous power in the form of discretion 
 
 174. Breyer, supra note 63, at 3.  
 175. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 10; Bibas, supra note 85; Bowman, supra note 47; 
Steven L. Chanenson, Guidance from Above and Beyond, 58 STAN. L. REV. 175 (2005); 
O’Hear, supra note 31.  
 176. Like the parsimony provision, the four traditional goals are currently contained in 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). 
OSLER.PP3 3/13/2009 9:18 AM 
293 Congress’s Sentencing Acid Trip 
 325 
to federal prosecutors,177 who can manipulate sentences by their 
charging decisions, their choices regarding cooperation, and their 
ability to control information going to the probation officer who 
prepares the presentence investigation report. The risk of losing that 
power might cause the Department of Justice to employ its 
significant lobbying abilities178 to stop any such change.  
If Congress seriously considered rewriting the guidelines, it is 
likely that the Department of Justice would argue, in part, that 
changing the current system in a way that might give judges more 
discretion would bring back disparities and destroy uniformity. There 
are many counter-arguments to this, of course, including some 
already articulated in this Article: the guidelines have increased, not 
decreased, disparity,179 and prosecutors themselves create great 
disparities under the current system.180 The best counter-argument 
to the Department of Justice would be, however, that the guidelines 
must be reformed if they are to give us hope for principled justice 
through federal criminal law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Predicting this fight over uniformity and judicial discretion, of 
course, brings us back to the Land of Point and Harry Nilsson’s acid 
trip. Remember that Oblio and Arrow were banished to the pointless 
forest, a place greatly feared by the pointy-headed types in the Land 
of Point. Once there, though, Oblio realized that the Land of Point 
was not what he expected: 
[O]ne of the first things Oblio and Arrow noticed about the 
Pointless Forest was that all the leaves on all the trees had 
points, and all the trees had points. In fact, even the branches 
of all the trees pointed in different directions, which seemed 
a little strange for a pointless forest.181 
 
 177. Albert Altschuler has described the employment of this discretion as being in the 
nature of the “good cop” to Congress’s mean “bad cop.” Altschuler, supra note 148, at 
112−13. 
 178. Stuntz, supra note 153, at 534. 
 179. Altschuler, supra note 148, at 101−02.  
 180. Id. at 100−02; Bibas, supra note 85, at 137−45. 
 181. HARRY NILSSON, THE POINT! (BMG Entm’t 1970), available at 
http://www.bluegrass.kctcs.edu/LCC/ENG/101nil.html. 
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The critics of increasing judicial discretion are correct in saying 
that it creates disparities—that the branches (judges) do tend to 
point in different directions. Judges differ, and they do so in 
substantive and occasionally troubling ways. Nonetheless, they tend 
to sentence on principles that do directly bear on the question at 
hand—that is, they have a concrete reason for doing what they have 
chosen with a given defendant. There will be, in other words, at least 
one principle at play that directly underlies the crafting of the 
sentence, a principle that is going to be articulated, explained, and 
connected expressly to the result by that judge.182 In short, the 
sentence that results from the discretion of a judge has a point, even 
if it is not the same point another judge might make in similar 
circumstances. While this does risk endangering the (perhaps false) 
perception of uniformity under the guidelines, it at least is better 
than our current guideline-driven system, which is so awash in 
conflicting policy goals that a principled point is not even possible. 
The present guidelines, even in advisory form, are hopelessly 
amoral because they are not informed by understandable, simple 
policy goals. If legislative will requires that we have guidelines, the 
guidelines we have now need to be scrapped and reformed from the 
ground up. Doing so will likely create greater judicial discretion, but 
for most Americans, I suspect that some disparity is an acceptable 
cost for the hope of a sentencing system with actual principles at 
play.  
It may seem harsh to describe Congress’s actions as an “acid 
trip,” but the analogy is not entirely inapt. For instance, one 
symptom of LSD183 use is the “fear of losing control.”184 It is 
indisputable that if a new guideline system was put into place, it 
might lessen Congress’s control relative to sentencing judges. 
However, this shift is necessary if we are to regain moral credibility in 
sentencing. 
 
 182. As Judge Cabranes put it, when a judge has discretion “[j]udgment proceeds from 
principles. These principles can and should be stated, rationally discussed, attacked, and 
defended.” STITH & CABRANES, supra note 6, at 82. 
 183. Lysergic acid diethylamide. 
 184. NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, NIDA INFOFACTS: HALLUCINOGENS: 
LSD, PEYOTE, PSILOCYBIN, AND PCP 3 (2008), http://www.nida.nih.gov/pdf/ 
infofacts/Hallucinogens08.pdf. 
